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4 The media and public risk 
Executive Summary 
 
The pursuit of audiences, and the nature of journalistic practices and news values, lead to 
some clear patterns in how the media cover risk.  Key factors are: 
 Body counts and „whose body counts‟ – the news media will tend to focus on risks which 
kill, injure, or threaten many people at one time, rather than have a cumulative effect over 
the years.   Threats to „people like us‟ gain more attention, as will attractive or famous 
victims or unattractive sources of threat. 
 Human interest angles and „relevance‟ – ideas about relevance are crucial both to the 
media‟s decision to cover a story, and the nature of the responses from audiences.  
Journalists seek out the „human face‟ of science and of risk.  Emphasis on „the victim‟s 
story‟ can mean that personal accounts may allow a risk to enter the media in spite of 
official denials; and the absence of existing „victims‟ may make a story less newsworthy.  
 Location – a geographically bounded event will provide a more media friendly crisis than 
one without a „news centre‟. Geographical or social distance between journalists and  their 
assumed audience also impacts on coverage 
 Visuals – the media, especially television, are attracted by the „spectacular spectacle‟.  
Such visuals also often have a very powerful impact on audiences. 
 Evidence of „harm‟ is usually more newsworthy than evidence of „benefits‟ or lack of harm.  
Exceptions to this are when reports of „safety‟ or „lack of danger‟ go against received 
wisdom or when there are other reasons for a particular media outlet to oppose central 
government declarations of danger. 
 The importance of events – news reporting tends to be „event‟ orientated rather than 
issue orientated. This means, for example, that a „leak‟ or „spill‟ will make a story but 
background pollution/radiation does not. 
 Official procedures – in the absence of a „disaster event‟, the news media will often 
examine a „risk‟ through official procedures such as permit application, regulatory 
decisions or an inquiry.  
 The impact of conflict, „cover-ups‟ and blame – in the absence of a clear disaster 
prompting risk coverage, then conflict and blame are often key criteria in media attention 
to risk  
 The spiral of concern – the media can create a self-perpetuating spiral of concern, with 
risk stories growing once they enter diverse parts of the news (e.g. a science story 
becoming a political story).  One part of the media can help to keep the story on the 
agenda of other parts of the media. Policy and audience responses to the agenda set by 
the media can also help keep an issue in the headlines. 
 
Sources, and their relations with journalists, have a major impact on which risks gain 
attention, how the stories play out over time and how stories are defined or „framed‟.  For 
example: 
 Official sources are routinely privileged 
 Government and corporate sources have bigger budgets for dedicated PR activities, 
although Governments often have less room for manoeuvre than corporations and the 
efficacy of official sources may be undermined by bureaucratic and political restrictions. 
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Alternative sources may have „better ‟ resources in terms of being able to process 
requests quickly, provide vivid quotes and produce „human interest‟ stories or dramatic 
demonstrations that make for good pictures. 
 Press releases and announcements of policy initiatives are a key source of news stories 
about risk, as are the main science journals. 
 An isolated „maverick‟ voice highlighting a risk may gain some initial attention. However, 
maverick voices tend to lose credibility and news value over time until, or unless, 
something else occurs to support pronouncements of doom. 
 
Once a story becomes framed as a scandal, specific questions may be raised that shift the 
initiative and power away from official definers of public risk. These include: 
 The question of „What Went Wrong?‟  
 The journalistic principle of „balance‟.  
 Absence of „proof‟ of safety.  
 The risk agenda of the story – if the story is „about risk‟, then those arguing that 
something is „safe‟ are inevitably put on the back foot.  
 The power of historical risk templates – historical analogies or ‟templates‟ are routinely 
used by journalists to make sense of unfolding events. 
 
Media influence can operate at several levels: 
 The media can „set the agenda‟ about what is important  
 It can have immediate impact through „scares‟. 
 It can cultivate a general sense of danger, or alternatively a sense that something is 
good. 
 It can frame and define problems and imply ideas for causes and solutions. 
 
Research into how people interact with media messages suggests that some feature of 
media may have more impact than others. „Information‟ about risk may be the least relevant 
part. Key features include: 
 Images 
 Narratives  
 Identification, and engagement with the imagination, bringing the risk home  
 What are the implications for me?  
 Associations suggesting connections between events or phenomena 
 Historical „analogies‟ or „templates‟ 
 „Who‟ and „Why‟ rather than „What‟ and „How‟ – often people do not think they will be able 
to understand the „what‟ and „how‟ of the technical dimensions of many complex risk 
issues; however they are still interested in the „who‟ and „why‟. 
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Main paper: The media and public risk  
 
1. Introduction  
The government recognises that policy-making could benefit from a more rounded 
consideration of public risk, including consideration of the role of the media alongside other 
key risk actors.  
 
Media coverage is often seen as problematic. This is partly because the media do not 
prioritise the most „realistic‟ threats as defined by traditional risk assessment experts; they 
operate according to an entirely different logic. TV news, radio reports and the press, for 
example, do not cover „risk‟ as formally defined (as a multiple of likelihood and impact), they 
cover stories: disasters, crises, controversies and Inquiries. Sometimes they „uncover‟ 
stories that some policy makers might prefer to remain out of the public domain, sometimes 
they report „scares‟ in ways that policy makers consider inaccurate and irresponsible, at 
other times the media ignore threats that policy makers would like to see taken seriously.  
 
This can result in a frustrating culture clash between policy makers/experts and journalists. 
However, rather than simply seeing news coverage as „irrational‟ or dismissing it as 
„sensationalist‟ it is important to try to understand the factors which shape such coverage 
and the different priorities that guide different stakeholders in debates about public risk. For 
example, although risk can be calculated in terms of probability and magnitude, much more 
is at stake than such a simple formula might suggest. Unlike ideas of „fate‟ or „misfortune‟, 
modern ideas of „risk‟ involve discussion of controllability and preventability. This inevitably 
places risk in the social and political arena, raising issues of accountability and fairness and 
associated ideas about trust and justice. It is these social and political dimensions that often 
seem to contribute to unexpected or „disproportionate‟ responses to risk once the issue 
enters the public domain.  
 
A range of existing research has examined the media‟s role in the UK in relation to risks 
ranging from BSE to the MMR vaccine, from paedophiles-in-the-community to terrorism. This 
report provides an overview of how risk reporting operates and why the media ampli fy (or 
„play down‟) risks in certain circumstances and how this shifts over time. It also summarises 
how media personnel interact with other key players (e.g. their „expert‟ sources and their 
audiences) and reflects on levers for change. 
 
2. A brief introduction to the range of actors  
This report is primarily concerned with the news media. The news media in the UK 
encompasses diverse outlets (e.g. TV, radio and newspapers) and different types of 
journalist (e.g. the science specialist, the political correspondent, the general reporter). The 
news media can also be subdivided in many different ways including by political leaning (e.g. 
the Guardian vs. the Daily Mail), funding stream and remit (e.g. the Public Service 
commitments of the BBC) and audience demographics (e.g. „Broadsheet‟, „mid-market‟, 
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„tabloid‟). The different ways in which this may impact on coverage are discussed in 
Appendix 1.  
 
Here it is simply important to note that the news is conveyed to the public via multiple 
channels of communication and that, in addition, each news report is produced through the 
interaction of diverse actors: 
 
 „Back stage‟ media actors include proprietors and regulators who help to frame coverage, 
as well as audiences themselves (who, for example, may impact on report ing through the 
letters and emails that they send in).  
 
 „Front stage‟ actors include the individual journalists who produce reports, but also other 
key individuals such as: editors, headline writers and „sources‟. The later category 
includes the scientists/ NGOs/ companies/policy makers launching a story, the press 
officers drafting the press release or organising the news conference, and the 
complementary or competing sources who offer additional comment. „Risk stories‟ often 
involve fraught contests over the true level of threat or questions of blame/responsibility. 
In this context relations with sources (who journalists turn to, and who they consider 
credible) become key and this is explored in section 5.3. 
 
The human actors identified above are also operating within a broader context involving 
issues such as resources, technological opportunities/obstacles, professional routines and 
norms and surrounding cultural assumptions. All of these help frame the way in which the 
media attend to risk – the next section summarises evidence about how and why the news 
media report risk in the way that they do; this is followed by a section addressing interaction 
with sources. 
 
3. What the media want out of involvement 
Journalists do not usually see it as their job to simply echo policy makers‟ advice about risk. 
Not do they see it as their job to become health educators or to champion scientists. There 
are some examples of significant cooperation between sections of the media and such 
stakeholders (e.g. in the AIDS crisis, see Miller et al, 1998, and in relation to stem cell 
research see Haran et al., 2008). However, the media, on the whole, have other motivations.  
 
A primary concern for journalists is to communicate in such a way as to attract audiences 
and ensure their interest and loyalty so as to keep up viewing/circulation figures (and, for 
commercial outlets, hence be able to market advertising space). Any news medium tries to 
maintain its distinct identity and reputation and encourage audience identification. It also 
strives to be seen to represent its audiences (e.g. a local newspaper‟s role in a „paedophile-
in-the-community protest). It may also want to be seen to influence policy (e.g. through 
campaigns) or act as „watchdogs‟ (e.g. exposing scandals and holding  politicians to 
account). Individual editors/journalists may also bring their own commitments and beliefs to 
the job (which can include a „public education‟ belief or a „promotion of science‟ mission) and 
this can influence the type of story they pursue and the way they try to represent risk. (See 
Appendix for how different media may prioritise different goals). However, above all 
journalists are acutely aware of the need to attract audiences and engage their interest - and 
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this includes the interest of their editor who could „spike‟ a story, as well as the interest of 
readers/viewers for whose attention they are competing. 
 
4. How the media report risk: the circumstances in which they amplify or diminish 
risk, why they become involved, why they focus on some risks rather than 
others. 
The pursuit of audiences, and the nature of journalistic practices and news values, lead to 
some clear patterns in how the media cover risk. Key factors impacting on media 
involvement include the „body count‟ (how many people are killed at once) and who is at risk 
(is it someone audiences care about?). Journalists will also consider whether the threat can 
be given a „human interest angle‟, how it can be made personally relevant to their audiences 
and where a threat occurs or disaster strikes. In addition coverage is influenced by the 
availability of striking visuals, a bias towards reporting evidence of harm, the events or 
official procedures which provide news hooks for stories and the themes of conflict and 
blame. Finally it is important to note the ways in which the media feeds on itself in a self -
perpetuating cycle of interest. Each of these issues, and the implications for risk reporting, is 
unpacked below. 
 
4.1. Body counts and ‘whose body counts’ 
 
 The news media will tend to focus on risks which kill, injure, or threaten many people at 
one time, rather than have a cumulative effect over the years (e.g. Singer and Endreny, 
1987; Hansen, 1994).This makes for a more dramatic story and is one reason why 
incidents involving aeroplanes, for example, gain much more attention per accident/death 
than car crashes.  
  
 Unusual risks are more attractive than common risks. In general „man bites dog‟ is a 
news story, vice versa is not (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992: 205). 
  
 The „celebrity culture‟ of the media/society means that media interest in a particular risk 
will often be stimulated by the death (or diagnosis) of one famous individual rather than 
the overall „body count‟ (Rogers and Chang, 1991). E.g. note the attention given to a 
young pop star such as Kylie Minogue getting breast cancer – and how this  can  impact 
on uptake of screening (Chapman et al., 2005). 
 
 Threats to „people like us‟ (as identified with by journalist, or as assumed to be identified 
with by their readers) gain more attention than threats to „the other‟ (e.g. those in the „3rd 
world‟). 
 
 The „attractiveness‟ of the victim influence the extent of coverage (e.g. the disappearance 
of a pretty blond child) (Jewell, 2008). 
 
 The unattractiveness of the source of threat will also influence how a risk is covered 
(„hoodies‟ with knives, „thugs‟ with dangerous dogs). 
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 Social movements can influence risk coverage e.g. the role of gay men in responding to 
HIV, or the women‟s health movement in highlighting attention to breast cancer. Coverage 
can also be encouraged by other types of „Risk entrepreneurs‟ such as those selling risk 
management solutions (insurance etc.). 
 
 Media coverage of risk is refracted through ideas about national interest and national 
boundaries (e.g. an interest in the risk to UK nationals abroad). Interest is also filtered 
through ideas about values and identity of the nation (e.g. notions about „Britishness‟ in 
the BSE crisis or beliefs about the unique „English countryside‟ being threatened by 
foreign imports of GM) (Hughes, 2007).  
 
 Other elements come into play extraneous to the risk including issues of social taboo, 
stigma or acceptability and blame. This impacts on why, for example, more attention is 
given to breast cancer than bowel cancer or lung cancer (Henderson and Kitzinger, 
1999). 
  
4.2. Human interest angles and ‘relevance’ 
 
Identification from readers/audiences and ideas about relevance are crucial both to the 
media‟s decision to cover a story, and the nature of the responses from audiences (e.g. 
journalists will observe that their readers have to decide whether to immunise their 
child/grandchild).  
 
 Journalists seek out the „human face‟ of science and of risk (Hansen, 1994) and the 
„popular ‟ orientation of some sections of the news media gives prominence to lay voices 
and perspectives (Petts et al., 2001). 
 
 The emphasis on „the victim‟s story‟ can mean that  
o Personal accounts may allow a risk to enter the media in spite of official 
denials (e.g. parents of an autistic child who believe damage was caused by 
the MMR vaccine).  
o The absence of existing „victims‟ may make a story less newsworthy; 
prospective or hypothetical victims are not enough to guarantee coverage 
(see the lapse in media attention to BSE prior to the officially declared link 
with vCJD, Kitzinger and Reilly, 1997).  
o Proactive preventative measures which pre-empt risk (and hence avoid 
victims) may gain less attention than reactive responses (Harrabin et al, 
2003, 32). 
 
4.3. Location 
 
 A geographically bounded event - such as a flood - will provide a more media friendly 
crisis than one without a „news centre‟.  
 
 The „type‟ of place in which a risk has made itself visible will influence the type of 
coverage. The poignancy of honeymoon couple shot dead on paradise island makes the 
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news, everyday problems of violence affecting those who live there does not. An attack in 
a rural idyll makes for a different framing than a similar attack in the inner city. 
Suggestions of sexual abuse on an isolated island are framed differently from stories of 
sexual abuse on the UK mainland (Kitzinger, 2004). 
 
 Geographical or social distance between journalists and their assumed audience impacts 
on coverage. A risk within the UK makes headlines in the UK, the same risk abroad may 
be ignored. Even with a city, the postcode of the centre of media operations (and place of 
habitation of journalists) may be echoed in the pattern of coverage (e.g. of damaged 
houses after an earthquake) – creating a disproportionate impression of who is at risk, 
and where help is needed.  
  
4.4. Visuals 
 
 The media, especially television, are attracted by the „spectacular spectacle‟. The 
existence of strong visual images increases the chances of television (and press) 
reporting of a risk (e.g. scenes of a melting edge of an iceberg crashing into the sea 
make „good telly‟).  
 
 Visuals from „citizen journalists (e.g. people using mobile phones) are becoming 
increasingly important in crisis reporting (e.g. footage used in reporting on 7/7 London 
bombings). 
 
 Such visuals also often have a very powerful impact on audiences. These may be 
„created images‟ (e.g. white suited protesters tearing up crops), images of caution (people 
wearing face masks to protect against infectious diseases such as SARS) or scenes from 
disaster (collapsing buildings, or helicopter shots of bodies floating in flood water). 
 
 Visuals can convey unintended messages of threat (e.g. an image of a steaming pond 
outside nuclear power station) (Corner et at., 1990) (see section 5). 
 
4.5. The emphasis on positive findings of harm 
 
 Systematic reviews of which types of risk are reported in the media suggest that there is 
some truth in the cliché that „Bad news is good news‟. Research which identifies positive 
evidence of „harm‟ is usually more newsworthy than evidence of „benefits‟ or lack of harm.  
  
 Journalists are more likely to pick up on research reports which have positive findings of 
risk, rather than research which reports no evidence of risk (e.g. Korn and Klein cited in 
Chapman and Lupton, 1994: 34). This also is reinforced by the bias towards the 
publication of such studies in the key journals. 
 
 Exceptions to this are when reports of „safety‟ or „lack of danger‟ go against received 
wisdom or when there are other reasons for a particular media outlet to oppose central 
government declarations of danger. Examples of this would include the 1980s Sun‟s 
headline „Straight sex cannot give you AIDS - Official‟ (based on statement by a member 
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of the House of Lords) (17 November 1989) and the 1990s Sunday Telegraph‟s headline 
„Passive smoking doesn‟t cause cancer - official‟ (8 March 1998). Examples of 
„reassuring‟ headlines in more recent years include: „Chocolate's good for you - official‟ 
(Daily Mail, 16 December 2006); „Official: drinking Guinness is good for your health‟ (The 
Mirror, 15 April 2004) and „It‟s official: stilettos are good for you‟ (Daily Star, 5 October 
2003). (Note how the declared use of an „official‟ source warrants such potentially 
controversial claims - see section 5.1). 
  
4.6. The importance of events  
 
The cycle of news production, organisation of news beats and routines of journalists impact 
on how issues are covered. One key issue is that news reporting tends to be event 
orientated rather than issue orientated (Kristiansen, 1988). This has important implications 
for how risk is framed. 
  
 The emphasis on reporting news events means, for example, that a leak will make a 
news story but background pollution/radiation is less likely to be included in the  „news of 
the day‟. (Allan et al., 2000, 8). Similarly, a crisis such as a famine or a flood will attract 
attention; the process which leads up to this crisis has little media value. 
 
 Long-term and continuous developments (such as environmental degradation) have less 
chance to manifest themselves within the production cycles of the media – at least in 
advance of crisis. (Hansen, 1991). Attention to issues such as global warming has to be 
generated by linking to political/media events (e.g. Al Gore movie, controversy about „the 
Great Global Warming swindle‟ debate) or crises close to home (flooding in US or UK) 
which can be linked to that risk. 
 
 This emphasis on events can make it hard to engage the media (and hence publics) in 
proactive discussion about how to prevent disasters as opposed to merely offering 
emergency responses after the event. 
 
The emphasis on events can also militate against engaging the media (and hence publics) in 
discussion of the appropriate risk/benefit balance in developing emerging technologies. 
Journalists and editors interviewed in the early to mid 1990s, for example, commented that 
genetics was not a „big news story‟ because of the lack of legislation or key events. When 
Dolly the cloned sheep was introduced to the public in 1997 this then seemed to come as a 
surprise which had been „sprung‟ on the public by scientists working behind closed doors 
(Kitzinger and Reilly, 1997, Haran et al., 2008). 
 
 It is important to note, however, that not all „risk events‟ become signifiers of risk. A „one -
off‟ incident can be isolated from having relevance in other circumstances or to future risk. 
The Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, for example, was arguably isolated as a 
problem „over there‟ in Russian nuclear power plants, not a general risk issue (see Luke, 
1987 for discussion of how this was achieved, cited in Allan et al., 2000). 
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4.7. Official procedures 
 
In the absence of a „disaster event‟, the news media will often examine a „risk‟ through 
official procedures such as permit application, regulatory decisions or an inquiry. This helps 
influence when coverage is received, it can also influence what type of risk gains attention, 
and how it is framed as a story.  
 
 Policy action (e.g. response to perceived risk) can generate coverage. The interaction 
between the media and policy makers can contribute to a sp iral of interest. The King‟s 
Fund, for example, highlights a media focus on issues such as waiting lists at the 
expense of what they identify as a much more serious public risk issues such as health 
inequalities. The problem is fed by the fact that the media highlight waiting lists, the 
government respond with targets, and the media then have another wave of stories on 
which to focus reporting (Harrabin et al., 2003, 4). 
 
 Policy inaction while it may initially attract critical coverage, often eventually leads to a 
decline in coverage - at least until a crisis hits. This dynamic can be illustrated by the lull 
in coverage of BSE before the official announcement of a link with vCJD. As one 
journalist commented it was very hard to get any story about BSE accepted during that 
time because: „nothing was being done‟ and journalists needed either action or „dead 
bodies‟ before they could revive the story (Kitzinger and Reilly, 1997). 
 
 The emphasis on policy action or procedures not only influences when, and what type , of 
risk gains attention; it may also influence the way the problems, and solutions, are 
framed. In particular, the focus on bureaucratic procedures may advantage some 
questions over others. For example, it may privilege a question such as: „has standard 
procedure been followed in setting up this new power plant?‟ over questions such as: 
„could conservation eliminate the need for this new facility?‟(Kunreuther et al. cited in 
Freudenburg et al, 1996: 34). 
  
4.8. The impact of conflict, ‘cover-ups’ and blame 
 
In the absence of a clear disaster prompting risk coverage, then conflict and blame are often 
key criteria in stimulating media attention to risk: 
  
 Media interest will be stimulated by overt conflict between stakeholders (Peters, 1980).  
 
 Media interest will be prompted by perceived government vested interests and secrecy 
(Miller and Reilly, 1995) and any whiff of a cover-up (especially post BSE and Weapons 
of Mass Destruction debacles in the UK) (Harrabin et al., 2003). 
 
 Scientific uncertainty is not necessarily attractive to journalists – controversy is (Kitzinger 
and Reilly, 1997). 
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 Sources (scientists, lobby groups etc.) who express tentative or qualified positions or say 
„we don‟t know‟ are less likely to be cited than those who express firm opinions one way 
or the other (Sandman, 1987: 100). 
  
 The ability to blame someone (an individual official, an institution, the government) may 
be an important criterion in attracting the media to a risk story (Sandman et al, 1987). 
 
 There is a tendency to look for individuals to blame for risk events, personalising the 
causes (Petts et al., 2001, viii). 
 
 Crucially, it depends who (or what) is to blame. A story may be resolved and disappear 
from the media once blame is seen to lie at the door of ordinary individuals. For example, 
the salmonella in eggs story was „resolved‟ once consumers rather than producers were 
seen to be at fault – and newspapers simply advised the „housewife‟ to make sure eggs 
were well cooked (Miller and Reilly, 1995). 
 
4.9. The spiral of concern 
 
The media can create a self-perpetuating spiral of concern.  
 
 A risk story will grow once it enters diverse pages (e.g. becomes not just a science story, 
but also a political story) – this leads to increased carrying capacity (discussed in 
Kitzinger, 1999). 
 
 One part of the media can help to keep the story on the agenda of other parts of the 
media. The Daily Mail campaign against the combined MMR vaccine, for example, helped 
to keep the issue live across the media, including on TV news (Harrabin et a l., 2003, 31).  
 
 Policy responses to the agenda set by the media can help keep an issue in the headlines 
(see Section 5). 
 
 Audience reaction (e.g. via the internet) may help keep an item on the news agenda as 
editors/journalists respond to public outrage. Stories about „scares and scandals‟ can 
forge links between journalists and their outraged public. As one study concluded: „public 
response, measured in letters, emails and phone calls, provided a powerful affirmation to 
some editors that they had touched their audiences, and motivated them to seek other 
examples of the types of stories that could create this level of response‟ (Harrabin et al, 
2003, 33).  
 
5. How the media interact with experts and government  
The above section focused on the news values and practices which help shape reporting of 
risk. This section focuses ion how journalists interact with expert, government and other 
sources and the implications of this for risk reporting. Sources, and their relations with 
journalists, have a major impact on which risks gain attention, how the stories play out over 
time and how stories are defined or „framed‟. Key factors include the resources and 
strategies of diverse sources and the routines of journalist-source relations. 
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5.1. The resources and strategies of sources 
 
 Government and corporate sources have bigger budgets for dedicated PR activities. This 
enables them to stay in the definitional contest to frame issues for longer. In the first 
phase of US press coverage of silicone breast implants in the 1990s for example, 
coverage focused on the health risks and featured testimony from women who alleged 
that their health had been compromised by implants. Following a major public relations 
campaign by the leading manufacturer, Dow Corning, however, later coverage was 
dominated by industry assurances that implants were safe (Powers and Andsager 1999).  
 
 Governments on the other hand often have less room for manoeuvre than corporations 
and the efficacy of official sources may be undermined by bureaucratic and political 
restrictions (inhibiting them from providing a quick and „quotable‟ response to journalists‟ 
enquiries).  
 
 Alternative sources may have „better ‟ resources in terms of being able to process 
requests quickly, provide vivid quotes and produce „human interest‟ stories or dramatic 
demonstrations that make for good pictures (Kitzinger, 1998: Miller et al,1998). This has 
been a prominent feature in the MMR controversy where parents convinced that their 
children‟s autism had been caused by the vaccine made  powerful advocates for the 
argument that the MMR vaccine was risky. (Boyce, 2008)  
 
 There is evidence, however, that some sections of the scientific community in the UK are 
learning to operate more like such pressure groups. This has been very notable, fo r 
example, in the media strategies adopted by those wishing to promote a liberal UK policy 
towards issues such as embryo stem cell research or work with „hybrid embryos‟. This 
has involved scientists liaising closely with charities (e.g. Parkinson‟s Society), mobilising 
human interest stories, and proactively campaigning to promote their point of view that 
the „real risk‟ lies in blocking such research. (See Haran et al., 2008). 
 
5.2. Routines of journalist-source relations 
 
The resources mobilised by different sources play out against a more general background of 
journalistic routines. Research into news reporting reveals some common patterns such as 
the following.  
 
 Official sources are routinely privileged (Stallings, 1990; Scahnne and Meier, 1992). 
 
 Press releases and announcements of policy initiatives are a key source of news stories 
about risk, as are the main science journals (e.g. science correspondents routinely 
examine the journals „Nature‟ and „Science‟). 
 
 Releasing information at pre-arranged press conferences with carefully arranged 
deadlines consolidates the power of official voices.  
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 Information that can be attributed to an „official‟ source is less likely to be scrutinised for 
validity than information from „alternative‟ sources.  
 
 The recent decline in profits for UK media organisations has led to cutting costs (e.g. 
shedding staff) and an increase in journalist‟s work loads. This, in turn has increased 
dependency not only on copy provided by news agency, but also on PR sources. 
Research by the Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies found that one 
in five newspaper stories were verifiably derived „mainly or wholly from PR material or 
activity‟ (Lewis et al., 2006, 17) and this was particularly true for stories about health – 
accounting for 37% of stories in this category  (Lewis et al, 2006, 21). (See also Lewis et 
al., 2008a and b) 
 
 An isolated „maverick‟ voice (such as Richard Lacey‟s in the early 1990s) highlighting a 
risk may gain some initial attention. A maverick voice has novelty value and makes for an 
interesting and often dramatic story. However, maverick voices tend to lose credibility and 
news value over time until, or unless, something else occurs to support pronouncements 
of doom.  
 
However, once a crisis occurs, or a story is redefined as being ‟about risk‟ some of these 
journalistic routines can shift allowing prominent space for certain types of „alternative‟ 
voices.  
 
5.3. Shifting rules for ‘risk stories’ 
 
Once a story becomes framed as a scandal specific questions may be raised that shift the 
initiative and power away from official definers of public risk or the policy makers. These 
include: 
 
 The question of „What Went Wrong?‟ A crisis (whether it is a terrible flood or the collapse 
of financial markets) raises the question of failed risk predictions or safety measures. 
This, in turn, opens the door for alternative voices critical of those with power and 
responsibility (under whose watch the crisis has occurred). Journalists may then become 
more critical of official sources, concerned about motives and open to treating different 
positions as legitimate (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992). This may still, however, be 
confined within certain boundaries – reporting of a financial crisis may for example, 
question the risk of certain kinds of financial dealings, but not „the risks‟ of the capitalist 
system. 
 
 The question: „What is being hidden?‟ Journalists will question if, for example, 
government sources are seeking to manipulate statistics (e.g. about knife crime)  
 
 The journalistic principle of „balance‟. Once a contest about risk has been raised 
successfully then a „balanced‟ approach to the debate may be interpreted by journalists 
as an obligation to give a platform to „both sides‟. This was evident, for example, in the 
MMR crisis in which the minority scientific voice questioning the safety of MMR was given 
an equivalent platform to the majority voice asserting its relative safety (Boyce, 2008). 
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 Absence of „proof‟ of safety. The negative frame around GM in the UK press partly gained 
ground because there was no settled scientific consensus on the long term impacts of 
GM crops/foods. Since the evidence was itself at issue (Hargreaves and Ferguson 2000) 
demands from the government and the established scientific community for factual 
accuracy in reporting made little headway and the way was left open for critical and 
oppositional voices to set the agenda (see Understanding Risk Team 2004).  
 
 The risk agenda of the risk story. If the story is „about risk‟, then those arguing tha t 
something is „safe‟ are inevitably put on the back foot. For example, those defending the 
safety of the MMR vaccine were put on the defensive in reporting which was „about‟ its 
potential dangers (Boyce, 2007) 
 
 A „risk story‟ frame raises questions beyond the technical. Media  (and „public‟) interest in 
a risk story goes beyond the merely technical. Journalists will take more account, for 
example, of the speaker‟s willingness to go beyond formal risk assessment statements to 
comment on political problems and solutions. Sources on different sides of a debate may 
differ in their willingness to do this. If official sources are seen to „hold back‟ on journalists, 
they will be more prepared to seek out alternative opinions and give a platform to 
„mavericks‟ (Kitzinger and Reilly, 1997). Seeing a story as simply being about „risk‟ may 
limit understanding of the wide range of interests and concerns that story generates – 
including broader questions about priorities, democracy, freedom of expression etc. 
 
 The power of historical risk templates. Historical analogies or ‟templates‟ are routinely 
used by journalists to make sense of unfolding events, and these have taken particular 
forms in the UK reporting of risk. One scandal around children being taken into care in 
Orkney in the 1990s, for example, was routinely framed through references to an earlier 
scandal in Cleveland in the 1980s and this led to a powerful framing of risk which 
identified social workers and the State as a threat to families (Kitzinger, 2004). Similarly 
the routine linking of GM foods and crops to the earlier BSE (Mad Cow disease) crisis 
„invited readers to look for a repeat of the government‟s prevarication, deception and 
perceived lack of concern with public health. (Murdock, 2004). 
 
6. A (very) short history of how coverage has evolved 
As the last point above makes clear journalists are influenced by the history of interaction 
between the media and experts/the government. The framing of debates about public risk in 
the UK is influenced by the history of BSE (which prompts comments along the lines of „we 
were told it was safe and it was dangerous‟) and of the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
debacle („they tried to scare us into compliance‟). In both cases forces were seen to 
manipulate the scientific evidence of risk – leaving journalists (and their audiences) wary. 
New initiatives including public engagement efforts, public consultations and self -conscious 
transparency are one way in which this history is trying to be „un -done‟. 
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7. The regulatory context 
The reporting of risk, as of any other topic, is influenced by regulations and guidelines about 
accuracy and impartiality. For example, the BBC news is committed to „impartiality‟ and the 
BBC have also developed their own guidelines about risk reporting – see 
bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/advice/riskreporting . However, the applicability of 
such guidelines varies depending on the media and, in general, the informal structures 
discussed above are more significant in shaping news.  
 
Some formal codes may also have unintended effects, for example, Harrabin et al argue 
that, at least in the past ironically, the BBC news may feel that obligations to be „objective‟ tie 
it into following a conventional news agenda (even where that news agenda has been set by 
the Daily Mail‟s attack on the safety of the MMR vaccine) (see Harrabin et al., 2003, 36). 
They conclude: „To avoid accusations of bias or campaigning, BBC news programmes often 
feel obliged to stick with the mainstream news agenda – an agenda partly constructed by 
newspapers that may have strong campaigning interests of their own‟ (Harrabin et al., 2003, 
3). 
 
8. How the media interact with publics, intended and unintended consequences  
Media coverage can contribute to cycles of risk debate. It can expose risks and provoke 
action resulting in the positive reduction of risk. However, it can also set up the public for 
„irrational‟ self-protective measures (e.g. making people scared of their children being 
abducted, contributing to a rise in childhood obesity as kids are driven to school or worrying 
women about using the contraceptive pill, exposing them to increased health risks linked to 
abortion and childbirth). Clear impacts are sometimes evident as in a decline (at least 
temporarily) in egg or beef consumption (Kitzinger and Reilly, 1997) or a change in the 
number of parents accepting the MMR vaccine for their children (Boyce, 2007). However 
media influence is not necessarily the most important factor (e.g. simply blaming media 
coverage for obese children would sidestep other issues ranging from the sale of school 
sports grounds or the cutting of bus services, to issues of urban design etc.) In addition, 
media influence is not always powerful, and does not affect everyone in the same way. The 
„impact‟ of the media on audiences therefore needs to be unpacked and contextualised. 
 
8.1. Types of media influence 
 
Research evidence suggests that media influence can operate at several levels. 
 The media can „set the agenda‟ about what is important e.g. with the attention it gives to 
global warming or financial (in)stability (See Agenda-setting theory, and examples such 
as Newell, 2000). 
 Media coverage can have immediate (albeit often short term) impact through „scares‟ 
 It can also cultivate a general, long term sense of danger over time. See, for example, the 
way in which the media covers violence against women locating it in dark alleyways, 
rather than reflecting the true statistics about who is responsible and where women are 
attacked -  this, in turn, has been shown to feed into women‟s concerns and avoidance 
behaviour (Weaver et al. 2000) 
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 Media coverage can also cultivate a general sense of what is a „good thing‟ (e.g. where 
solutions to risk lie, or whether some risks are worth taking because of the benefits they 
may bring). For example, the aura around stem cell research that it will lead to cures, and 
that the „risks‟ are therefore justified by the „opportunities‟ (Hughes and Kitzinger, 2008) 
 Media „frames‟ can help define problems and imply ideas for causes and solutions 
 
8.2. How people interact with the media and ‘take messages home’ 
 
Research into how people interact with media messages suggests that some features of 
media may have more impact than others. „Information‟ about risk may be the least relevant 
part. For example, key features include: 
 
 Images: e.g. an image of people in white protective suits is the most memorable image 
from the GM media coverage and conveys a powerful image of threat (Hughes and 
Kitzinger, 2008). Images may even undermine the spoken message: e.g. a shot of a 
steaming pond next to a power plant may leave audiences of a documentary with a 
powerful impression of threat even if the overall message of the programme is more 
reassuring (Corner et al., 1990) 
 
 Narrative structure: e.g. the narrative structure used to present an account (e.g. of a 
family tackling childhood leukaemia) may have a greater impact than an explicit message 
about a statistical lack of association between nuclear power plants and cancer (Corner 
et al., 1990) 
 
 Identification and imaginary engagement bringing the risk home: media messages which 
engage people imaginatively may be particularly powerful and memorable, and provoke 
dissemination through interpersonal discussion. For example, this was demonstrated in 
the power of dramatisations about „inherited breast cancer‟ risks which engaged women 
in thinking about what they would do if faced with choices about gene testing and 
prophylactic mastectomy (Henderson and Kitzinger, 1999). 
 
 Associations: The repeated association of references to „the hole in the ozone‟ and 
„global warming‟ leads many people to assume that the two are linked (Hargreaves et al., 
2003). 
 
 Historical „analogies‟ or „templates‟: Journalists frequently link present, unfolding events, 
to past „case proven events‟ (the Vietnam War, The Second World War, the BSE debacle) 
(Hughes et al, 2008; Mairal, 2008). This seems particularly common in risk stories where 
the uncertainties of the present/future are interpreted through the lens of the past. The 
templates mobilised by the media have been shown to have a powerful impact, not only 
on how journalists frame their stories, but on how people recall and interpret emerging 
risk debates (Kitzinger, 2000). 
 
 What are the implications for me? Similarly media consumers may feel less engaged by 
complex economic theory (e.g. in the current financial crisis) but be very interested in 
knowing whether their savings are safe, and what they should do about their mortgage. If 
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they have to actually make a decision then the raising of an uncertainty may be 
particularly important (e.g. when the MMR coverage turned a previously routine act – 
accepting vaccination for your child- into an active area of decision making by raising the 
shadow of doubt - see Boyce, 2007) 
 
  „Who‟ and „Why‟ rather than „What‟ and „How‟: Not everybody is interested in every 
aspect of a risk problem in equal measure. With many complex risks people do not think 
they will ever be able to understand the „what‟ and „how‟ of the technical dimensions, 
however they are still interested in the „who‟ and „why‟. For example, in discussions of 
developing new science and technologies research participants often state that only the 
„experts‟ will truly understand the technical details, but they as citizens want to understand 
and address the motivations of those developing the technology (e.g. is it industry or 
government and is it for „profit‟ or „the common good‟) (Kitzinger et al., 2008).  
 
8.3. The mediation of media effects by external factors 
 
Media impact on people is mediated by many factors beyond the actual media text too: 
 
 Media messages can have unexpected effects on people‟s risk assessments or behaviour 
depending on their social context (e.g. advice to use condoms unless you are „100% sure 
of your partner, may be interpreted as a reason to stop using condoms as a 
demonstration of trust) (Miller et al., 1998). 
 
 People consciously resist/negotiate with media information (e.g. rejecting risk messages 
as media „scare mongering‟ or the „nanny state‟).  
 
 People do not just passively accept static cultural norms, they work with them and are 
flexible negotiators of meaning. For example Nature‟ may be seen as an absolute virtue 
(e.g. appealing to „the balance of nature‟) in discussion of the genetic modification of 
crops „). However, a different image of Nature may be invoked in discussion of genetic 
modification for the treatment of disease (e.g. a „flawed nature‟ which needs correcting, or 
„nature red in tooth and claw‟) (Hughes and Kitzinger, 2008). 
 
 Different groups of audience may have different reactions depending on their 
demographic/social characteristics.  
 
 Media information also interacts with what people know from other sources (their work 
place encounters, their family and friends, their religious leader, their GP etc). This is one 
reason why, for example, most parents were worried by the media coverage of MMR, but 
most still continued to accept MMR vaccinations (Boyce, 2007). 
 
 People will interpret the proposed risk and benefits through the lens of their experience of 
citizenship. For example, in one study most research participants knew little about the 
risks or benefits about nanotechnology. However, most responded to the potential of such 
technology positively (associating it with miniaturised consumer goods such as the „nano 
ipod‟ or positive medical advances). A group of Muslim research participants, however, 
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expressed concern that nanotechnology might be used in surveillance and to erode civil 
liberties. (Kitzinger and Hughes, 2008). 
 
 Messages from the media about risk interact with other dimensions of the risk which may 
address fundamental psychological, social or cultural issues (ranging from the importance 
of whether or not the risk is chosen, to the symbolic status of food (in the GM debate), or 
the utility of a mobile phone (in the discussion of risks from mobile phone technology) 
(See BERR paper on „Publics‟).  
 
 Crucially people‟s ability to act on risk information received from the media will be 
circumscribed by a wide range of social circumstances (e.g. responding to health advice 
about using condoms or eating more healthily may be inhibited by social stigma, social 
relations, or access to shops selling fresh fruit and vegetables). 
 
9. Levers for change 
Quite what counts as „good coverage‟ of risk is open to debate. Many of the factors outlined 
above are also intractable to change. However, given the dynamics and interactions outlined 
in this report there are four areas where change might be pursued: 
 
Dialogue between the media and policy makers: e.g. input into training and guidelines, and 
opportunities for secondments (e.g. journalists working with risk policy makers and vice 
versa) as well as developing innovative web-based communication tools. 
 
Working with sources: This again could include training, guidelines, resources and 
opportunities for scientists and policy makers presenting risk issues to the media, and 
opportunities to reflect on their assumptions and strategies. 
 
Publics: „media literacy‟ helps people to make sense of media representations and their own 
responses, „risk literacy‟ might also be a fruitful way of engaging publics in the debate (as 
long as this goes beyond the technical and addresses people‟s own concerns about the 
framing of risk and includes discussion of the broader debates). 
 
Context: More fundamentally the impact of the media in debates about public risk depends 
on wider issues such as the transparency and reputation of advice-giving bodies, and the 
relationship between scientific advisers and policy makers, citizens and the State. It is not 
simply a question of „communicating the facts‟, but includes questions about institutional 
body language and trust, and issues about how social problems are framed. Media actors 
are not operating in a vacuum that can somehow be changed without addressing wider 
issues. 
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Appendix 1: Unpacking generalisations  
An overview of patterns in the reporting of risk inevitably carries its own „risks‟: the danger of 
unhelpful generalisation. It is crucial, therefore, to acknowledge explicitly some of the cross-
cutting variables that come into play.  This appendix briefly highlights some variables 
 
A1.1. Differences between diverse risk topics:  
Each risk story covered by the media will have its own patterns of actors, associations, 
series of events, or characteristics. As Petts et al argue (2001): „issues may have different 
„risk signatures‟ including diverse dimensions such as whether, for example, people trust the 
institutions seen as responsible for managing the risk and whether or not it raises moral 
considerations (Petts et al., 2001, viii). „The existence of these risk signatures means that 
communication about risks requires issue-specific attention. There can be no single risk 
communication „recipe‟ (Pets et al., 2001: viii) It is not even possible to generalise about how 
the media cover a risk „area‟. For example, a study of media coverage of „the risks of 
emerging science and technology‟ compared 3 topics: GM crops, Stem cell research and 
nanotechnology and found very different profiles for each – ranging from the very cautious 
(the predominant coverage of GM) to the more supportive (the more prevalent type of 
coverage for stem cell research in most news outlets) (Hughes and Kitzinger, 2008). 
 
A1.2. Differences between diverse news media: 
The summary of risk reporting in the main body of this report has, of necessity, presented a 
short general overview. However it is important to recognise differences between diverse 
news outlets in the way they report risk including how they source stories,  who they quote, 
who they blame, and the type of solutions for which they call. Such differences are often 
evident to the casual observer who can see a difference in how The Daily Mail, for example, 
treats a story compared to The Guardian. Such differences have also been systematically 
mapped by research comparing diverse risk stories in the UK which have found the 
following: 
 
 Differences between tabloid and broadsheets: For example, broadsheets are more likely 
to carry risk stories prompted by government/political action, whereas papers such as the 
Sun are more likely to present stories based on personal experience (Petts et al, 2001, 
59). The visuals in the Tabloids tend to focus on the victims, highlighting consequences of 
risks as opposed to questioning causation (Petts et al., 2001, viii). Broadsheets were 
more likely to call for more research to address a risk problem, whereas papers such as 
the Sun called for immediate action or redress. Tabloids also often adopt a populist 
framework which distinguishes between „us‟ and „them‟ (e.g. the Fat Cats) (Petts et al., 
2001, 57) – and some papers particularly promote discourses about the „Nanny State‟. 
Daily Mail headlines, for example, include: ‟Nationalising of childhood; . . .or the final 
proof the Nanny State really has gone gaga‟ (March 15, 2007) and „Parents must say 'no' 
and not let the Nanny State say it for them; The answer to obesity in our children lies with 
families and not with a prohibition on adverts for junk food‟ (Daily Mail, November 21, 
2006). 
.  
 Differences between TV channels with a public service remit, and those without: BBC1 
and Channel 4 were more likely to carry quotes from established political actors, ITV and 
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Channel 5 used more vox pops from members of the public to comment on risk stories 
(Petts et al., 2001). 
 
 Differences between individual papers: This will lead to clear examples of how a story 
may be framed in any particular instance. Hansen, for example, examined Greenpeace‟s 
occupation of the redundant Brent Spar oil platform designed to prevent Shell from 
sinking it in the North Sea. His work shows that while critical voices can command news 
attention for their claims through dramatic, highly visual, actions they have much more 
difficulty controlling the way their claims are framed and inflected by individual 
newspapers. Whereas the left of centre tabloid, the Daily Mirror, hailed Shell‟s decision 
not to sink the rig as a „Victory For the People‟, the conservative broadsheet, the Daily 
Telegraph, attacked it as „A Triumph for the Forces of Ignorance‟ (Hansen 2000). 
Systematic differences in use of sources in diverse newspapers are also detectable 
through quantitative analysis across a range of risk stories. For example, pressure groups 
gain most attention in the Guardian while corporate spokespeople are most likely to be 
quoted in the Telegraph (Petts et al., 2001, 62).  
 
 Differences between local and national media: many studies focus on National UK media. 
However local newspapers are widely read and can have a key influence on community 
debate (Petts et al., 2001, vii). This in turn can impact on national understandings of risk 
and risk policy/management (see „Paedophiles in the Community‟ issue – Kitzinger, 
2004). Local media also have distinct conditions under which they operate.  A local paper 
reporting about pollution from a local factory, for example, may balance its concerns 
about pollution causing asthma in children, with its concerns to keep local jobs. 
 
 Differences between different formats within newspapers: For example one study found 
that although all formats „under report‟ risks posed by smoking or obesity, there are 
differences by format. The „softer ‟ inside pages feature more coverage addressing health 
risks such as alcohol, obesity or smoking, whereas the hard news pages (such as the 
front page) cover stories more influenced by mainstream news values (Harrabin et al., 
2003, 15). 
 
 Differences between TV news and newspaper reporting: Similarly TV news reports are 
more bound by mainstream „hard news‟ values than papers in general – thus offering 
even less attention to the risks of smoking, alcohol use or obesity than the press 
(Harrabin et al., 2003, 15). 
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Appendix 2: A post-script on the „new media‟ 
The bulk of the discussion in this report has focussed on the „traditional‟ media such as TV 
and newspapers. However, it is important to reflect on issues that may be raised by the „new‟ 
and „emerging‟ media enabled by technology such as the internet and mobile phone. The 
generic term „new media‟ is often used to include phenomena such as blogging, social 
networking on the web, use of Google for information searchers, the new forms of 
information and dialogue evident on sites such as „Wikipedia‟, and the emergence of „user 
generated content‟ such as mobile phone video footage. Claims for the new media include 
that they could: 
 broaden the range of sources contributing to the debate (e.g. anyone with access to the 
technology can circulate their ideas or experiences), 
 broaden the range of discourses and widen understanding (e.g. the role of the „Baghdad 
blogger‟ in the course of the American invasion of Iraq) 
 expand opportunities for citizens to learn about complex problems (Krimsky, 2007) 
 allow internet organizing to circumvent the filters and obstacles normally encountered in 
trying to publicise a risk through conventional print and broadcast media (e.g. via the 
chain mail principle) (Rodrigue, 2002) 
 increase the two-way flow of communication (allowing for a record of dialogue about any 
statement)  
 increasingly mean that the mass media may be resourced by powerful, eye witness 
accounts (e.g. videos from the site of a disaster taken on mobile phones – as we saw in 
the London bombings of 7/7) 
 allow people to access information and representations across national boundaries (e.g. 
turning to Al Jazeera as well as BBC on line), and expose users to competing versions of 
reality 
 speed up information exchange (contributors can comment at any point without 
deadlines) 
 allow for greater depth of information (through links and the lack of limita tions on length of 
any piece) and 
 facilitate the creation of virtual communities of interest around risk, or support networks in 
times of crisis (e.g. role of internet during and after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans) 
(Mythen, 2007) . 
 
From one point of view the internet potentially is a positive „democratisation‟ of the 
information sphere and „cyber-optimists‟ celebrate the impact of such changes. From another 
perspective, the more „cyber-pessimist‟ view point, such changes introduce many problems 
including not only unequal access to the new media, but also problems such as: 
 the degradation of information (through rampant rumour mongering and lack of source 
accreditation) 
 a decline in the quality of „disaster reporting‟ with an increased emphasis on material from 
untrained but on-the-spot „citizen reporters‟ with powerful images and personal accounts 
but a lack of analysis 
 empowering „inappropriate‟ risk entrepreneurs to mobilise fear and resistance (e.g. the 
use of websites highlighting the dangers of vaccination – see Calandrillo, 2004 cited in 
Krimsky, 2007) 
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 the fragmentation of the audience (into ghettos of interest and self-confirming circles of 
information exchange) 
 and the erosion of traditional media (as internet use may have an economic impact on 
how conventional journalism is resourced and marketed) . 
 
Empirical research into the impact of the internet on risk debates in general is still relatively 
sparse. Research suggests that, on a day to day level, (i.e. if not facing a crisis), most 
people still rely on traditional branded news sources even if delivered via the internet e.g. 
BBC online (Petts et al., 2001). The crucial point to bear in mind is that while the internet 
may provide endless sources of information and links, people still have limited  resources of 
their own time for information seeking and processing. The potential impact of the internet, 
for example, is mediated by people‟s access to the medium (e.g. do they have internet 
access at home? Are they allowed to make use of it at work?). It is also influenced by their 
motivation to use it. Understanding what motivates people to make more intensive use of 
new media is therefore key to understanding how the potential of new technologies and 
platforms are realised in any particular case. Existing research suggests that individuals will 
turn to the internet for risk information if they: 
 
1. Want up-to-date or supplementary risk news because of a perceived threat to their 
personal safety/well-being or the safety/well-being of loved ones (e.g. after a cancer 
diagnosis) or are prompted by a major event covered in the news (e.g. the Tsunami) 
2. Require more detailed information than is available through traditional media because 
they have decisions to make (e.g. going on-line to get information about the risks of a 
particular drug that has been prescribed to them, to research the impact of a phone mast 
going up near their home or going on-line to seek financial information in response to a 
perceived threat to their savings or investments) 
3. Feel that the mainstream media or their existing social context does not provide the 
information and support they require (see, the emergence of on-line communities of 
interest) 
4. Lose trust in the mainstream national media or wish to be exposed to other perspectives 
(e.g. some people‟s distrust of western media reporting on 9/11 and accessing of media 
from other countries, or accessing of specific sites discussing different theories about 
9/11). 
 
Research after the 9/11 attack on the twin towers in New York illustrates how the internet 
may come into play in crises. There was a dramatic increase in internet traffic after 9/11 
(Bucher, 2002). The internet was widely used as a source of secondary information, as well 
as acting as a site for hoaxes and rumours, displays of public grieving and anxiety 
(Anderson, 2003). The internet also allowed people to access widely diverging accounts to 
„explain‟ 9/11 and this often took on international dimensions. Traffic to US sites from other 
countries doubled after the attack, and there was also a dramatic increase in traffic to sites 
for newspapers in Pakistan and Israel as well as sites such as „Afghanistan Online‟ (Bucher, 
2002). 
 
Such research into the new media has crucial implications not only for having an on -line 
presence in risk debates (especially during crises) but also highlights the significance of the 
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reputation of sources as accessible, informative, interesting and unbiased as well as its 
potential to provide in-depth or background information tailored to the needs/interests of 
different audiences/users. Predicted changes in the skills levels of the population and their 
familiarity with the internet as well as technological changes (e.g. convergence and 
increased portability and access) suggest an on-going need to understand developments in 
the role of new media. 
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A response: points made by the media in 
an event to discuss this research   
 
The role and motivation of the media 
The media need to attract an audience and this clearly affects what they produce – the 
content should be wanted by the target audience and has to be credible for that audience.  
However, the dominance of the need to attract an audience can sometimes be exaggerated.  
Individual journalists may clearly want to get space, ideally on the front page, but are not 
necessarily obsessed with the idea of this (e.g. boosting circulation). Many other values, 
practices and priorities also come into play.   
 
There is a question as to whether the media causes risk aversion.  This is a chicken and egg 
question: does the public have a predisposition to favour risk minimization, which the media - 
seeking to maximise audiences - play to?  Historically, there's dialectic between the public 
and the media, with the latter influencing perceptions. But it is important to recognise that 
there is perceived to be a prevalent culture which is risk averse, and to which the media 
respond.  The extent to which editorial standards are important is debatable , and may 
depend on the journalist and media outlet.  Some see it as very important that news be 
balanced, verified (and rapid), not least because ethics and standards have a direct effect on 
marketing, as for any consumer product.  Others see "editorial standards" as an oxymoron 
for most newspapers, or suggest that the media‟s object is often to scare and the information 
content needed is contingent on this. 
 
Providing information is seen as an important role for the media, although the need to 
entertain can increase the chance that risks will be “played up” or scare tactics used. 
Influencing policy is also seen as a high priority, whether to correct injustices or to combat 
growing PR manipulation and control of government. 
 
Other motivations of the media include representing the „ordinary person‟, acting as 
watchdogs, campaigning, commercial imperatives and the personal interests and drives of 
journalists.  Motivation will also vary from media outlet to media outlet – for example the BBC 
has less of a campaigning agenda than the News of the World. 
 
Media influence 
In an era of public accountability public institutions – including policy makers and Ministers - 
may be more susceptible to the influence of the media than other bodies. Ministers may be 
especially influenced by sensational stories. The Government can be hugely oversensitive to 
media, especially to the tabloids, and overestimate the media's ability to judge public 
opinion. The temptation to react in a knee-jerk fashion has been exacerbated by 24 hour 
news, and this is only likely to get worse.  It can be very difficult for policy makers to do 
nothing, in an environment where “something must be done”. 
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The media influences other media.  Sometimes this is a benign influence – leading to a 
vastly increased collective power for newsgathering.  Sometimes however, especially in an 
environment where there are fewer resources to cover more sources, this can have more 
undesirable consequences, as it can lead to issues can be widely reported even without a 
proper basis.   
 
The public is ambivalent about media messages. They say “don't believe all you read in 
paper or see on TV” but then settle arguments by saying I read it in [in one newspaper] or 
saw it on [tv].  Audiences have healthy scepticism, and their perceptions of risk and trust 
matter to the media.  Risk amplification and risk attenuation by the media are significant 
phenomena. 
 
Influences on the media 
The media are influenced by their audiences, who they need to buy/watch their products – 
this makes audience and sales figures important, as well as feedback from through market 
research, letters, calls, complaints etc.  The media need to make judgments about what will 
attract the audience, for example looking at what will affect their lives or what will entertain 
them, while providing a basic standard of service, for example through news being 
sufficiently accurate. 
 
Journalists are of course influenced by their sources – they are generally not expert in fields 
other than communication.   They may have a variety of sources - each with a different 
relationship and motivation - including official sources, leaks, PR and lobby organisations 
(who may even provide copy), spin doctors, issue-led organisations, analysts and experts.   
There are certain people with agendas who often appear on the media – they are generally 
available, outspoken and articulate, though far from reliable. 
 
Government sources are seen as the most professional spinners of data and the best 
connected in the media.  They could be personal contacts in government or official 
spokespeople.  The reliability of these sources depends on individual and relationships more 
than the title of a job.  Consistency of message affects the perceived reliability of a source.  
Journalists aim to spot differences between what politician says and any official line, and to 
bring debate alive will often look for friction - an adversarial element.  Opposition party views 
also important - media will look for a credible opposing opinion.  There is respect for "officia l" 
sources, as opposed to "Government" sources.   
 
Regulators, for example the press complaints commission or the BBC trust, affect the 
framework for news production but rarely impact on the coverage of a particular story. 
 
Lawyers and litigation culture have a major influence.   Everyone is frightened of being sued 
and the cost of it; the process is expensive even if you are found not guilty.  Campaigning 
and investigative journalism is restricted because of it.  This is made worse by lawyers‟ 
interests in fuelling litigation culture, the complexity of the law, which makes people play 
safe, and wider cultural changes.   
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Other influences on journalists include internal media actors – such as owners or editors, 
advertisers and commercial interests.   
 
Other key points 
There is scepticism about the honesty and responsibility of Government in discussing the 
limits of its ability to control risk, as well as a suggestion that Government does not engage 
the public in debate about levels of acceptable risk and where responsibility lies for 
managing risks.  There are questions as to whether Government is serious about reducing 
public risk.   
 
It was suggested that Government sometimes uses risk to its advantage, using scare stories 
to get policies through, for example on ID cards. 
 
Some people do not believe government statements, for example on the financial crisis or 
the safety of GM food.  Independent sources were seen as key to enable the public to 
believe certain statistics, for example. 
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